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Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect
Privacy?
Deidré A. Keller
[T]he claim that lies beneath the notion of intellectual property is similar or identical to the one
that underpins notions of privacy. . . . [T]he need we have to be able to do something by
convention that is impossible by force: . . . to ringfence certain information.2
I. Introduction
In the summer of 2015 amidst the beginnings of the 2016 presidential campaign,3 historic
Supreme Court decisions,4 and regular reports of protests,5 some might have missed the copyright
angle to the Ashley Madison story. In fact, many may have missed the Ashley Madison story
altogether. It is worth retelling, in brief, because it highlights the question with which this article
is concerned – to what extent should copyright protect privacy.
In the summer of 2015, Ashley Madison, a website that bills itself as “The Original
Extramarital Affairs Site”6 the tagline for which was, “Life is Short, Have An Affair,”7 was
hacked.8 The e-mail addresses and credit card information of its 37 million users were accessed
2

NICK HARKAWAY, THE BLIND GIANT: BEING HUMAN IN A DIGITAL WORLD 128 (2012).
Nicholas Confessore et al., Presidential Race Just Starting? Not According to the Spending, N.Y. TIMES (July 25,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/us/presidential-race-just-started-not-according-to-the-spending.html;
Peggy Noonan, The 2016 Contest Begins to Take Shape, WALL STREET J. (July 17, 2015, 6:15 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-2016-contest-begins-to-take-shape-1437089919.
4
Robert Barnes, Affordable Care Act Survives Supreme Court Challenge, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/obamacare-survives-supreme-courtchallenge/2015/06/25/af87608e-188a-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling
Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html.
5
Wale Aliyu, Police Pepper Spray Crowd After “Black Lives Matter” Conference, USA TODAY (July 27, 2015,
8:01 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/27/police-pepper-spray-cleveland/30722441/;
Howard Blume & Kate Mather, Black Lives Matter Activists Charged in Fracas at Event, L.A. T IMES (June 29,
2015, 8:56 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-black-lives-matter-activists-charged-20150629story.html; Sam Frizell, Sanders and O’Malley Stumble During Black Lives Matter Protest, TIME (July 18, 2015),
http://time.com/3963692/bernie-sanders-martin-omalley-black-lives-matter/; Nicole Norfleet, St. Paul Black Lives
Matter Group Pushes Ahead With State Fair Protest Plans, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 28, 2015, 10:55 AM),
http://www.startribune.com/st-paul-black-lives-matter-group-pushes-ahead-with-state-fair-protest-plans/323173881.
6
ASHLEYMADISON.COM, https://www.ashleymadison.com/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015).
7
See, e.g., Chris Mills, AshleyMadison Confirms Hack, Purges Leaked Info from Internet, GIZMODO (July 20, 2015,
9:43 PM), http://gizmodo.com/hackers-threaten-to-expose-40-million-cheating-ashleyma-1718965334/1719170821.
The tagline “Life Is Short, Have an Affair” is even trademarked, with U.S. registration number 3745718.
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=3745718&caseSearchType=US_APPLICATION&caseType=DEFAULT&searc
hType=statusSearch (last visited Sept. 1, 2016).
8
Mills, supra note 7.
3
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and downloaded.9 The hackers, who called themselves The Impact Group, posted a sample of the
information they obtained online along with a manifesto threatening to post all of Ashley
Madison’s users’ sensitive information unless the site was taken down.10 Predictably, the site was
not taken down and The Impact Group made good on its threat.11
Following the hack, the owner of Ashley Madison, Avid Life Media (“Avid”),12 promptly
issued a statement acknowledging the breach and assuring its subscribers that Avid would make
sure the leaked information would be removed from the internet.13 A number of websites where
the hacked content had been posted acquiesced to Avid’s demands.14 The tool Avid used to
accomplish the seemingly impossible task of having information removed from the internet was
the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (“DMCA”) takedown provision.15
Avid’s use of the DMCA takedown procedure poses a number of interesting questions.
Those addressed contemporaneously by legal commentators focused primarily on the doctrinal
questions of whether: (1) the content in question was copyrightable and (2) Avid should be
considered the author or copyright owner of that content, for purposes of the DMCA.16 This piece,
on the other hand, considers the normative question of whether copyright ought to protect privacy
interests in scenarios like the Ashley Madison hack or, more broadly, whether the Copyright Act
has a role to play in the protection of privacy.
While some courts have held that “[i]t is universally recognized . . . that the protection of
privacy is not the function of our copyright law,”17 the remedies afforded copyright owners make
pursuing copyright claims an attractive option to privacy plaintiffs.18 Copyright remedies include

9

Id.
James Temperton, Hackers Threaten 37 Million AshleyMadison “Cheaters” with Exposure, WIRED UK (July 20,
2015), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ashley-madison-hacked.
11
Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:55 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/.
12
Note that the owner has since changed its name to Ruby Corp. See, Erik Larson, Adultery Site Ashley Madison
Puts Hacking Affair Behind It, Bloomberg Law (December 14, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/adultery-site-ashleymadison-puts-hacking-affair-behind-it/.
13
Mills, supra note 7.
14
Hope King, Ashley Madison Tries to Stop the Spread of Its Leaked Data, CNN MONEY (August 21, 2015, 5:14
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/21/technology/ashley-madison-dmca-requests/.
15
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012) (insulating service providers from liability upon good faith removal of allegedly
infringing material); Jeff John Roberts, In Ashley Madison Hack, Copyright “Solution” Is Worse Than No Solution,
FORTUNE (July 21, 2015, 1:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/21/in-ashley-madison-hack-copyright-solution-isworse-than-no-solution/; see also, Joseph Cox, Ashley Madison Sent Me a DMCA Request for Tweeting Two Cells
of a Spreadsheet, MOTHERBOARD (August 15, 2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/ashley-madison-sent-mea-dmca-request-for-tweeting-two-cells-of-a-spreadsheet.
16
See, e.g., Stephen Carlisle, The Ashley Madison Hack: Why is a Website for Cheating Spouses Sending Out
Dubious DMCA Notices?, NOVA SOUTHEASTERN U. (July 23, 2015), http://copyright.nova.edu/ashley-madisonhack/ (“The facts aggregated by [Avid Dating Life] are purely the result of who signs up for the service, and who
has removed themselves from the database by deleting their account. In other words, the facts have self-selected
themselves.”).
17
See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
18
See, e.g., Erica Fink, To Fight Revenge Porn, I had to Copyright My Breasts, CNN MONEY (April 27, 2015, 1:32
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/26/technology/copyright-boobs-revenge-porn/.
10

the removal of digital copies from the internet and the destruction of physical copies.19 The extent
to which copyright ought to protect privacy interests has been considered in various jurisdictions
recently20 but has not been treated comprehensively by contemporary legal scholars in the United
States.21 This piece seeks to undertake that treatment.
Part II of this paper begins this consideration by discussing two cases in which plaintiffs
asserted copyright claims in addition to privacy allegations, though the underlying injuries were
clearly primarily privacy-based. Part III provides a brief overview of the current state of privacy
law. Part IV then considers the theoretical and jurisprudential overlap between privacy and
copyright, and highlights the problems presented by protecting privacy through copyright. Part
IV also suggests two relatively modest legislative solutions: (1) a limited federal statute that would
provide a plaintiff alleging online privacy infringement with a remedy analogous to the DMCA’s
takedown provisions available to those alleging online copyright infringement; and (2) statutorily
adopting the moral right of disclosure already recognized in other countries in order to codify the
common law right of first publication.22 Finally, Part V concludes by returning to the Ashley
Madison example to consider the potential of the proposed solutions to address the problems
presented.
II.

Recent Privacy Cases Brought Under the Guise of Copyright Claims

While Americans tend to speak of rights in absolute terms,23 it is clear that all rights are
not created equal. One of the most important theoretical contributions of the legal realists is the
understanding that remedies are “constitutive components” of rights.24 It is impossible to
understand the scope and substance of a stated right without understanding the remedies that may
follow infringement of that right.25 Therefore, understanding why a plaintiff seeking to stop the
dissemination of a particular work might proceed under a copyright theory rather than, or in
addition to, a privacy theory, requires a basic understanding of the available remedies and the
relative ease and promptness of halting dissemination under each paradigm.
None of the four privacy torts effectively address the concerns raised by plaintiffs who
assert copyright to defend privacy interests. This is so, at least in part, because the remedies for
privacy tort liability pale in comparison to the remedies available for copyright infringement. The
19

17 U.S.C. §§ 503, 512 (2012).
See infra part IV.C.
21
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Protecting Privacy Through Copyright Law?, PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 191, 198 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) (“Whether courts should allow copyright
claims to protect personal interests in cases such as these is a question left to another day.”). See also Jeanne C.
Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 557–
64 (2015) (considering cases in which privacy and reputational interests are actually at stake in copyright litigation).
22
For a discussion of copyright as a moral right, see Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEXAS A&M L. REV. 873
(2014).
23
See, generally, MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (The Free
Press 1991).
24
HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 148
(2013) (“Situating remedies at the core of our understanding of rights, that is, perceiving remedies as constitutive
components of rights, is one of the most important lessons of legal realism.”).
25
Id.
20

Copyright Act provides definite and substantial statutory remedies.26 These include damages of
up to $30,000 or $150,000 in cases in which willful infringement can be demonstrated.27 In
addition, the plaintiff may be entitled to injunctive relief.28 Moreover, the prevailing party in an
action for copyright infringement may also be awarded substantial attorney’s fees and costs.29 In
light of these statutory remedies, the DMCA’s takedown procedure can be a highly effective tool.30
It provides sites that host content with a safe harbor against claims of copyright infringement so
long as they diligently aid copyright owners in removing infringing content from the sites.31 Given
the potential alternative of expensive copyright litigation and the significant potential damages that
may be awarded, internet service providers are very motivated to act in accordance with the wishes
of copyright owners.
On the other hand, the remedies for invasion of privacy are far from definite. The right to
privacy tort is governed by state law and the available remedies vary from state to state.32
Finally, nothing like the immediate relief the DMCA provides is readily available through a
lawsuit for invasion of privacy. A privacy plaintiff’s best-case scenario is to file a lawsuit with
the hopes of obtaining a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction early in the
litigation. Given the vagaries in privacy law amongst the states, this is far from certain. Internet
Service Providers and other potential defendants are therefore not nearly as likely to take the
requests of a privacy plaintiff seriously.
Terry Bollea’s dispute with Gawker highlights some of the problems a privacy plaintiff
seeking to halt dissemination, particularly online, might encounter that a plaintiff proceeding under
a copyright theory would not.33 The Bollea / Gawker dispute arose in 2012 when Gawker posted
approximately 100 seconds of video footage in which Mr. Bollea is seen having sex with a woman.
At the time the footage was shot, both Mr. Bollea and the woman in the video were married to
other people.34 After filing suit in federal court alleging copyright infringement, and then dropping
that suit,35 Bollea filed suit in Florida State Court. Although the jury in Bollea’s state court action

26

17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2102).
28
17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
29
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). See also Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting
that the District Court had awarded Defendant nearly $3 million in attorney’s fees and costs.).
30
See, e.g., Maryanne Stanganelli, The DMCA Through the “Lenz” of Fair Use: The Ninth Circuit Finds Fair Use
Analysis Required Before Sending a DMCA Takedown Notice, IP INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2015/09/15/the-dmca-through-the-lenz-of-fair-use-the-ninth-circuit-finds-fairuse-analysis-required-before-sending-a-dmca-takedown-notice/.
31
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
32
See, e.g., Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 4(V)-E; 14 N.Y.Prac., New York Law of Torts §
1:66; 21 Fla. Prac., Elements of an Action § 1503:1 (2015-16 ed.).
33
Terry Bollea is the former professional wrestler better known as Hulk Hogan. See, Complaint. at 6-8, Bollea v.
Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F.Supp.2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 8:12–02348–T–27TBM, Dkt. 1).
34
See, e.g., Dan Good, Janelle Irwin, and Leonard Greene, Hulk Hogan takes the stand in $100M sex tape trial, says
mean wife drove him to romp with pal’s spouse, N.Y. Daily News (Mach 7, 2016), available online at
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/hulk-hogan-takes-stand-100m-lawsuit-gawker-article-1.2555554.
35
Notice of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice (December 28, 2012), Bollea, 913
F.Supp.2d at 1325 (Dkt. 68).
27

ultimately awarded Bollea $115,000,000 in compensatory damages36 and $25,000,000 in punitive
damages,37 none of Bollea’s pleas for injunctive relief succeeded.38
If Bollea owned the copyright in the video at the time that Gawker posted the clip, Bollea and
Gawker may never have ended up in court in the first place. The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act provides a ready remedy for copyright owners who find their content improperly posted
online.39 The Bollea narrative demonstrates the attractiveness of proceeding under a copyright
theory to a plaintiff who alleges her privacy has been infringed online. However, the appeal of a
copyright claim to a plaintiff with privacy concerns is in no way limited to online conduct. Hill v.
Public Advocate of the United States demonstrates the potential advantages of copyright claims in
cases where dissemination occurs entirely offline.40
The plaintiffs in Hill were two men who posted their engagement pictures online, and their
photographer friend, who took the pictures.41 The defendants were various individuals and entities
responsible for the production and dissemination of a political campaign flyer that utilized one of
the engagement photographs in connection with campaigns against various candidates for public
office whom, it was asserted, were supportive of rights for gay people.42 Below is the original
photograph alongside one of the flyers:

36

Nick Madigan and Ravi Somaiya, Hulk Hogan Awarded $115 Million in Privacy Suit Against Gawker, N.Y.
Times (March 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/business/media/gawker-hulk-hoganverdict.html?_r=0. (Note well that the Florida state court case that resulted in this tremendous award was initiated
after the voluntary dismissal of the federal case including a copyright claim. The federal case is discussed infra notes
247, 248 and 252 and accompanying text.)
37
Paul Callan, Hulk Hogan Verdict body-slams Gawker, CNN (March 22, 2016), available online at
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/20/opinions/hulk-hogan-verdict-warning-shot-media-opinion-callan/.
38
The Federal District Court rejected the request for injunctive relief. See, Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1328
(“Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief is due to be denied because he has produced no evidence
demonstrating that he will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction.”). The Florida Court of Appeals
reversed the Circuit Court decision to grant a temporary injunction. See also, Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129
So. 3d 1196, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2014) (“Because the temporary injunction is an unconstitutional prior
restraint under the First Amendment, we reverse.”).
39
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider, if the service provider . . . upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity.”).
40
Hill v. Public Advocate of the U.S., 35 F.Supp.3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014).
41
Id. at 1351.
42
Id. at 1352.

The plaintiffs filed suit in District Court in Colorado alleging misappropriation of the likenesses
of the pictured plaintiffs, as well as infringement of the photographer’s copyright. 43 The District
Court of Colorado interpreted the photographed couple’s claims as privacy allegations and
dismissed those claims on First Amendment grounds.44 Conversely, the defendants’ asserted fair
use argument failed to overcome the photographer plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim.45 The
parties settled shortly after the Court’s ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss.46
While Hill and Bollea demonstrate why a plaintiff with privacy concerns might proceed
under a copyright theory, this paper is more interested in whether courts ought to entertain
copyright allegations in those circumstances. This question has received brief consideration lately,
with particular attention paid to potential First Amendment concerns.47 While this paper will touch
briefly on these concerns,48 its particular focus will be on two problems not yet addressed in the
literature. First, seeking to vindicate the privacy rights of subjects through the current copyright
regime is complicated and perhaps inappropriate because copyright is fully alienable and as such,
the copyright owner of a particular work is often neither the subject, nor the author, of the work.49
Second, courts considering privacy issues under the guise of copyright claims have a propensity
to perceive a constitutional privacy issue where the facts only support a tort claim.
What follows immediately is a brief overview of the history and development of the right
to privacy in the United States, which will demonstrate two important points. First, tort privacy
and constitutional privacy are distinct rights—the first a right against other individuals, the second,

43

Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1354, 1357.
45
Id. at 1360 (“the Plaintiffs' have stated a plausible copyright infringement claim . . . and I DENY Public Advocate
and the Defendants' Motions To Dismiss . . . to the extent they seek dismissal of the Plaintiffs' copyright
infringement claim based on the fair use doctrine.”).
46
Notice of Settlement, Hill, 35 F.Supp.3d 1347 (No. 12–02550–WYD–KMT, Dkt. 149); see also, Caitlin Gibson,
Case against advocacy group tied to Loudon County supervisor ends in settlement, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014),
available online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/case-against-advocacy-group-tied-toloudoun-county-supervisor-ends-in-settlement/2014/06/19/e6ea1b1e-f7cc-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html
(July 22, 2016).
47
See, e.g., Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the
First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2016).
48
Section IV infra.
49
17 U.S.C. 201(d).
44

a right against the government. Second, privacy is personal; that is to say, it is an inalienable right
that belongs to individuals.
III.

Privacy Law, In Brief
A. General Principles

Warren and Brandeis described privacy as a nascent concept in the common law, which
they conceived of as a “right to be let alone.”50 Warren and Brandeis’ article, The Right to Privacy
has recently been hailed as “the most influential of all law review articles.”51 At the time Warren
and Brandeis were writing, no court of last resort in the United States had yet recognized a common
law right to privacy.52 In fact, it wasn’t until fifteen years after The Right to Privacy was penned
that the Georgia State Supreme Court would become the first court of last resort in the United
States to recognize the right to privacy.53 It would take another sixty years for the United States
Supreme Court to recognize a constitutional right to privacy.54 Today, the right to privacy is
widely recognized by state statute and common law,55 and is constitutionally protected against
governmental intrusion.56
Since Warren and Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy, some general principles regarding
the right to privacy have emerged. Chief among these for the purposes of this article are the
personal nature of the right to privacy, and the development of two distinct strands of
jurisprudence: (1) state law articulating the privacy tort as a matter of state statutory law and
common law; and (2) federal law enunciating a constitutional right to be free from governmental
interference.

50

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). On the poetic
license Warren and Brandeis are utilizing here, see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1187, 1190 (“Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as the ‘right to be let alone,’ a phrase adopted from Judge
Thomas Cooley's famous treatise on torts in 1880. Cooley's right to be let alone was, in fact, a way of explaining
that attempted physical touching was a tort injury; he was not defining a right to privacy.”).
51
Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1503 (2012).
52
RICHARD A. GLENN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW, 56 (ABC-CLIO, Inc.
2003).
53
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386-88 (1960).
54
Anita L. Allen, The Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 1199
(2012).
55
See ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001) (“It is true that most states now
permit recovery of damages for some types of invasion of personal privacy. Minnesota joined the pack in 1998,
leaving North Dakota and Wyoming as the only two states whose courts have never recognized privacy as a cause of
action.”).
56
See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989) (“This Article is about the
constitutional right to privacy, a right that many believe has little to do with privacy and nothing to do with the
Constitution. By all accounts, however, the right to privacy has everything to do with delineating the legitimate
limits of governmental power. The right to privacy, like the natural law and substantive due process doctrines for
which it is a late-blooming substitute, supposes that the very order of things in a free society may on certain
occasions render intolerable a law that violates no express constitutional guarantee.”).

i.

Privacy is Personal

The first court of last resort in the United States to recognize a right to privacy made clear
that the right to privacy is personal, belonging to particular individuals. The Georgia State
Supreme Court in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. stated, “[t]he right of privacy, or the right
of the individual to be let alone, is a personal right. . . . It is the complement of the right to the
immunity of one's person.”57 In initially theorizing the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis
spoke of the right of “each individual . . . [to] determin[e], ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”58 In articulating the constitutional
right to privacy, the Supreme Court agreed that this is, in fact, a personal right. 59 The right to
privacy is inalienable. That is to say, invasions of the right to privacy can only be vindicated in a
suit by the individual whose privacy has been invaded.60 Relatedly, corporate entities do not enjoy
a right to privacy under either tort theory or constitutional theory.61
ii.

The Privacy Tort and the Constitutional Right to Privacy are Distinct

Although the right of privacy tort and the constitutional right to be free from governmental
intrusions have similar theoretical underpinnings, as one commentator notes, these two types of
privacy are “categorically” distinct.62 “Certain privacy encroachments stem from the actions of
private individuals, and other privacy encroachments result from intrusive governmental action.
The first type of privacy encroachment . . . [is] tort privacy.”63 On the other hand, “[c]onstitutional
privacy has come to mean the right of the individual to be free from unwanted and unwarranted
governmental intrusion in matters affecting fundamental rights.”64 The Supreme Court recognized
this in Katz v. U.S., stating, “the protection of a person's general right to privacy—his right to be
let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to
the law of the individual States.”65 The Court also stated: “the Constitution protect[s] personal
privacy from . . . governmental invasion.”66 The remainder of this Section addresses constitutional
privacy and tort privacy, in turn.
B. Constitutional Protections
The constitutional right to privacy was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut in 1965.67 To properly understand the myriad ways in which the Constitution
protects privacy and the ways in which those protections are related to each other and to the privacy
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tort,68 we must consider a line of Supreme Court decisions that includes Griswold, but neither
begins nor ends there. Interestingly, Brandeis, whose article first articulated the right to privacy
tort, also figures prominently in the narrative of the constitutional right to privacy.69
What follows is a brief treatment of the Constitution’s role in protecting privacy. 70 The
remainder of this section proceeds in four parts. First, I will consider the concept of decisional
privacy that developed from the Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, which is widely
recognized as the first time the Supreme Court recognized a right to privacy.71 Next I will consider
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in which the concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
developed. Then, I will consider the various ways in which the First Amendment protects privacy
interests. Finally, I conclude this section with a synopsis of these various constitutional privacy
protections.
i. Decisional Privacy
Sixty years after the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy tort, 72 the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized the constitutional right to privacy. In a splintered
decision, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut73 held that although the Constitution does not
See, Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1357 (1992) (“Many commentators
have attempted to sever the ‘expectation of privacy’ which has evolved in American jurisprudence under the Fourth
Amendment, from the tort of privacy created by Warren and Brandeis in 1890, the ‘fundamental‑decision privacy’
later introduced in Griswold v. Connecticut, and other forms of privacy which have concurrently taken shape in
American law. Such a sharp division is unfortunate, however, because history confirms that the various offshoots of
privacy are deeply intertwined at the roots, owing their origins to the same soil.”).
69
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, 7 (Oxford University Press 2015) (“Later in his life, [Brandeis] penned
a second major contribution to privacy—his dissent in Olmstead v. United States. This introduced modern concepts
of privacy into constitutional law. It led to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test governing Fourth
Amendment law, and shaped the constitutional right to privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v.
Wade.”).
70
Some of the privacy literature treats the development of constitutional privacy protections at the state level. See,
e.g., Timothy O. Lenz, ‘Rights Talk’ About Privacy in State Courts, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1613 (1997). (Discussion of
the interaction of state constitutional privacy protections and copyright is beyond the scope of this article.)
71
See generally JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: BIRTH CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF PRIVACY (University Press of Kansas 2005).
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Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); see infra notes 141, 147-149.
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (J. Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. There were three
separate concurrences and a dissent. The first concurrence, written by J. Goldberg and joined by C.J. Warren and J.
Brennan was intended to “emphasize the relevance of [the Ninth] Amendment to the Court’s holding.” The second,
written by J. Harlan concurs in the judgment only. Harlan would have based the decision not on the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights or “any of their radiations” but, rather, on the “concept of ordered liberty. . . .” The
third concurrence was written by J. White. It too concurs in the judgment only and locates the basis of the right
claimed by Griswold in the Fourteenth Amendment. White’s concurrence focuses on Connecticut’s failure to
articulate a compelling state interest. Finally Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart dissented. Black and Stewart
were wary of granting Constitutional protection to what they say had previously been understood as merely a tort:
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The phrase “right to privacy” appears first to have gained currency from an article written by Messrs.
Warren and (later Mr. Justice) Brandeis in 1890 which urged that States should give some form of tort
relief to persons whose private affairs were exploited by others. Largely as a result of this article, some
States have passed statutes creating such a cause of action, and in others state courts have done the same
thing by exercising their powers as courts of common law. Thus the Supreme Court of Georgia, in granting

affirmatively articulate a right to privacy, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”74
Within these penumbras, the Court identified a constitutional right to privacy that guarantees
freedom from “governmental intrusion.”75
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter penned the Court’s most descriptive articulation
of the right to privacy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,76 stating:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Our
cases recognize the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Our precedents have
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.77
This line of constitutional privacy cases demonstrates that the Constitution recognizes a zone of
privacy around individuals within which each individual must be free to make certain fundamental
decisions without governmental intrusion.78 More recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,79 the Supreme

a cause of action for damages to a man whose picture had been used in a newspaper advertisement without
his consent, said that “A right of privacy in matters purely private is . . . derived from natural law” and that
“The conclusion reached by us seems to be . . . thoroughly in accord with natural justice, with the principles
of the law of every civilized nation, and especially with the elastic principles of the common law . . . .”
Observing that “the right of privacy . . . presses for recognition here,” today this Court, which I did not
understand to have power to sit as a court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which
Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule which
prevents state legislatures from passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with “privacy.” (internal
citations omitted)).
74
Id. at 484.
75
Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77
Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted).
78
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S 589, 599-600 (1977) (characterizing the right recognized in Roe v. Wade and its progeny
as “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”); GLENN, supra note 52, at 12; DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 31 (Harvard University Press 2009) (“[T]he Court has conceptualized the
protection of privacy as the state’s noninterference in certain decisions that are essential to defining personhood.”);
Id. at 166 (“Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe all protect against what I call ‘decisional interference’—that is,
governmental interference with people’s decisions regarding certain matters in their lives. These cases extend to
decisions relating to sex and sexuality, as well as parent’s child-rearing decisions.”).
79
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

Court overturned its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick80 and held that a Texas state law
prohibiting sex between homosexuals was unconstitutional.81
The line of cases stretching from Griswold to Lawrence demonstrates that within the
constitutional zone of privacy are issues including, but certainly not limited to, contraception,82
abortion,83 same-sex intercourse,84 and child-rearing.85 Griswold was the first Supreme Court
decision to specifically articulate privacy as a constitutional right, and these privacy cases are the
starting point for understanding constitutional privacy protections.86 However, Justice Brandeis
actually planted the seed for the idea that there is a constitutional aspect to privacy in his dissent
to the Court’s decision in Olmstead v. U.S.87
ii. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In 1928, nearly forty years after co-authoring The Right to Privacy with Samuel Warren,
Louis Brandeis was in his twelfth year as a Supreme Court Justice.88 That year, the Court heard
Olmstead v. U.S.89 in which it was to decide whether wiretapping without a warrant violated a
criminal defendant’s rights under the Constitution.90 The majority held that such wiretapping
violated neither the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
nor the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination.91 Dissenting in Olmstead,
Brandeis specifically called attention to the right to privacy. Rejecting the majority’s narrow
reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Brandeis said:
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope. The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
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Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained
by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.92
Just as Warren and Brandeis conceived of the right to privacy in response to technological
advances in photography,93 Brandeis based his reading of the privacy right into the Constitution
on technological advances: “Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the
Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet.”94
It would take nearly forty years, but ultimately, Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead would win
the day in Katz v. U.S.,95 in which the Court held that warrantless wiretapping did indeed violate
the Fourth Amendment.96 Recently, in Riley v. California,97 the Court further considered the
Fourth Amendment in the context of newly-developed technology; specifically, cell phones. In
Riley, the Court held that warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone violated the Fourth
Amendment.98 The Court stated: “A search of the information on a cell phone bears little
resemblance to the type of brief physical search [incident to arrest] . . . .” 99 This Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is primarily important to the analysis of the copyright / privacy overlap
because it demonstrates the continuing importance of technological advancement in the
development of privacy jurisprudence. What follows is a brief discussion of the First
Amendment’s role in protecting privacy interests.
iii. The First Amendment and Privacy
The relationship between the First Amendment and privacy is complicated and
multifaceted.100 The potential conflict between privacy and the First Amendment has been treated
extensively in the literature.101 The most common form of conflict occurs where the First
Amendment right to freedom of the press conflicts with an individual’s asserted privacy interest.102
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This conflict relates to the pursuit of copyright infringement claims in factual scenarios that raise
privacy questions. As such, this article will address such conflict in Section IV, below.103 This
section will now consider the extent to which the First Amendment’s protection of the right to
freedom of speech may also be seen as protective of privacy.104
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause is seen as protecting privacy in at least
two distinct ways. First, the First Amendment has been understood to encompass the right not to
speak since as early as 1943.105 Courts have also long recognized the First Amendment interests
of unwilling listeners.106
In 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States, relying upon its decision in W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,107 declared, “[t]he right of freedom of thought . . . as guaranteed by the
Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all.”108 Since then, “[f]or the most part, government attempts to force individuals
to affirm beliefs contrary to their own . . . are subject to strict scrutiny and struck down.” 109 In
Wooley v. Maynard, the Court stated, “[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”110 Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Wooley affirmed the existence of the right not to speak
while finding that the case at hand implicated no such right.111 The Chief Justice said:
The State has not forced appellees to “say” anything, and it has not forced them to
communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened to “speech,” such as
wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate or waving a flag as a
symbolic gesture. The State has simply required that all noncommercial
automobiles bear license tags with the state motto, “Live Free or Die.” Appellees
have not been forced to affirm or reject that motto; they are simply required by the
State, under its police power, to carry a state auto license tag for identification and
registration purposes.112
Rehnquist’s dissent in Wooley demonstrates that while the Supreme Court was unanimous in
recognizing that the right not to speak is inherent in the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
103
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clause, reasonable people may disagree on what constitutes an infringement of that right. 113 For
Rehnquist, in order for the right to be implicated the government must be compelling persons to
communicate particular speech and the display of a state slogan on a license plate simply did not
meet that criteria.114 A number of cases since Wooley have recognized the right not to speak.115
Recent scholarly treatment of the First Amendment recognizes the public’s interest in being free
from compelled disclosures.116
In addition to protecting the “right not to speak,” the First Amendment is also seen as
protecting the “right not to listen.”117 The right not to listen concept is understood as having
developed out of a privacy interest.118 As such, what we might ordinarily understand as tort
privacy seems to take on a “quasi-constitutional” aspect.119 Political or religious speech may lose
its First Amendment protection because the intended audience is not willing to listen and that
unwillingness trumps the protections that would normally be afforded to such speech.120 These
cases present an interesting scenario in which one private party has allegedly invaded the First
Amendment rights of another, and the court deems the interests at issue to be constitutional.
While the concepts of the right not to speak and the right not to listen are well-established,
recent scholarship considers the role of the First Amendment in intellectual privacy and
informational privacy. Neil Richards recently considered the concept of “intellectual privacy.”121
Richards asserts that the First Amendment plays a role in creating a space for formulating and
articulating ideas prior to or even in the absence of disseminating those ideas.122 Utilitarian theory
supports this line of reasoning by specifically focusing upon the First Amendment’s role in
protecting privacy as a necessary prerequisite to the development of political ideas and the
resulting enhancement of political discourse.123 As articulated by Richards, intellectual privacy is
important for analyzing the relationship between copyright and privacy because the development
113
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speech. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression. . ..”).
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of political ideas will likely produce copyrightable content. Similarly, informational privacy,
which is defined as “the right of the individual to control dissemination by the government of
information concerning his or her person”124 concerns arguably copyrightable content.
Interestingly, although the Supreme Court has thus far refused to protect informational privacy as
a constitutional right,125 a number of scholars continue to advance it as an important concept in the
digital age.126
The First Amendment’s contributions to protecting privacy are important in understanding
the extent to which copyright law ought to protect privacy. The “right not to listen” is conceptually
related to the ways in which copyright owners have asserted the First Amendment. “Right not to
listen” cases present scenarios in which an individual’s privacy interest is deemed superior to the
asserted First Amendment rights of the putative speaker, although there appears to be no state
action.127 Meanwhile, in Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. The Nation Magazine, the Court
relied on the “right not to speak” to protect privacy interests that had previously been protected by
the right of first publication.128 Likewise, the concept of intellectual privacy is related to the
production of copyrightable content and the concept of informational privacy deals directly with
halting dissemination of content that may well be copyrightable.
iv.

Constitutional Privacy Protections: A Brief Wrap-Up

The three constitutional protections that are most relevant to considering the extent to
which copyright ought to protect privacy are decisional privacy, the Fourth Amendment
conception of reasonable expectation of privacy, and the First Amendment freedom of speech
privacy protections. Decisional privacy is important because it was the first constitutional right to
privacy recognized by the Supreme Court. Decisional privacy jurisprudence articulates the scope
of the subject matter protected within the zone of privacy. The Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy” line of cases demonstrates how privacy jurisprudence has evolved in
response to technological advancement. The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause has
previously been asserted as protective of privacy interests in the context of copyright litigation.129
Finally, intellectual privacy and informational privacy, though not previously considered in the
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context of copyright litigation, have to do with the creation and dissemination of potentially
copyrightable content.
Understanding each of these provides a foundation from which we may consider whether
copyright’s potential contribution to privacy protection is more analogous to constitutional privacy
protections or tort privacy protections. The next section discusses the privacy tort. This piece then
turns to the copyright scholarship and cases taking up the relationship between privacy and
copyright.
C. The Invasion of Privacy Tort
While Warren and Brandeis are viewed as the progenitors of tort privacy, 130 Professor
Prosser is credited with harmonizing the various cases in which the right to privacy developed.131
The Restatement reflects Prosser’s categorization.132 It reads:
The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.133
The tort of invasion of privacy was first recognized by a court of last instance in Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co.,134 in which the Georgia State Supreme Court found New England
Life Insurance Company liable for using a photograph of Pavesich in connection with an
advertisement without Pavesich’s consent.135 Today, more than 110 years since Pavesich, the tort
of invasion of privacy is recognized in the vast majority of American jurisdictions.136 The
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Pavesich decision warrants further consideration both for its conceptualization of the right it
enunciated and because it has influenced the development of the right to privacy in other states.137
The Pavesich Court framed the issue it was considering as “whether an individual has a
right of privacy which he can enforce, and which the courts will protect against invasion.” 138 In
answering this question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized that it was
making new law, meticulously discussed the state of existing law and stated the justifications for
its holding. In explaining its reasoning, the Pavesich Court called upon natural rights, saying:
The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized
intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its
existence. Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once
that as to each individual member of society there are matters private and there are
matters public so far as the individual is concerned. Each individual as instinctively
resents any encroachment by the public upon his rights which are of a private nature
as he does the withdrawal of those of his rights which are of a public nature. A
right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law. This
idea is embraced in the Roman's conception of justice, which “was not simply the
external legality of acts, but the accord of external acts with the precepts of the law,
prompted by internal impulse and free volition.”139
Later on in the decision, the Court brought together the concepts of property, assault, and privacy,
saying:
The individual has always been entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and
enjoyment of that which is his own. The common law regarded his person and
property as inviolate, and he has the absolute right to be let alone.140
This important maneuver bridged the gap between the right to be let alone in the context of assault,
and the right to privacy that the Pavesich Court was pronouncing.141 The Court also called on
prior precedent that relied upon property theories under similar factual circumstances. The Court
went on to consider the utilitarian justifications for a right to privacy. It said:
[A]s to certain matters the individual feels and knows that he has a right to exercise
the liberty of privacy, and that he has a right to resent any invasion of this liberty,
and, if the law will not protect him against invasion, the individual will, to protect
himself and those to whom he owes protection, use those weapons with which
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nature has provided him, as well as those which the ingenuity of man has placed
within his reach.142
The Pavesich Court expounded upon the utilitarian basis for recognizing a right to privacy, stating,
“the peace and good order of society would be disturbed by each individual becoming a law unto
himself to determine when and under what circumstances he should avenge the outrage which has
been perpetrated upon him or a member of his family.”143 By engaging both natural rights and
utilitarian theory, the Pavesich Court demonstrated both the need to recognize the right to privacy
for the benefit of individuals and the public interest in recognizing that right. Having articulated
the theoretical bases for recognizing the right to privacy, the Pavesich Court went on to explain its
choice to break with the existing jurisprudence, which emphasized property or contract theories.
The Pavesich Court understood that by finding in the plaintiff’s favor it was recognizing a
right that had not previously been articulated in American law. The Court:
conceded that prior to 1890 every adjudicated case . . . which might be said to have
involved a right of privacy, was not based upon the existence of such right, but was
founded upon a supposed right of property, or a breach of trust or confidence, or
the like, and that therefore a claim to a right of privacy, independent of a property
or contractual right . . . had, up to that time, never been recognized . . . . 144
The Court criticized what it referred to as the “conservatism of the judiciary,”145 noting: “[a]ny
candid mind will, however, be compelled to concede that, in order to give relief in many of those
cases, it required a severe strain to bring them within the recognized rules which were sought to
be applied.”146 Finally, the Court noted, as Warren and Brandeis had,147 that technological
advances made it more likely that one’s privacy would be invaded by an errant photographer.148
Tort law regarding privacy has developed significantly since Warren and Brandeis
conceptualized it and the Georgia Supreme Court first recognized it. Still, Prosser’s categorization
continues to represent the definitive word on the various iterations of the tort.149 The remainder
of this section treats intrusion, public disclosure, false light, and misappropriation in turn.
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Intrusion, public disclosure, and false light will be treated together as they bear a number of
similarities. Because misappropriation overlaps in some complicated ways with the right of
publicity, this section concludes with a consideration of the similarities and differences between
the two.
Intrusion, public disclosure, and false light all require intentional acts that would be seen
as highly offensive by a reasonable person.150 Moreover, each of these can be seen as overlapping
with some previously existing tort. For example, false light is often criticized, and some States
have refused to recognize it,151 because it is seen as too similar to defamation.152 Finally, all three
of these are thought to protect against mental anguish.153 Therefore, the remedies available are
usually monetary damages aimed at compensating the plaintiff for mental harm suffered.154
Unlike the first three privacy torts, misappropriation is seen as somewhat commercial in
nature.155 That is to say, the interest protected by the misappropriation tort is not merely mental in
nature.156 In harmonizing the privacy jurisprudence and distinguishing among the types of harms
encompassed in the invasion of privacy cases, Prosser said, “[i]t seems sufficiently evident that
appropriation is quite a different matter from intrusion, disclosure of private facts, or a false light
in the public eye. The interest protected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the
exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”157 And, while some
courts and scholars seek to separate the privacy tort of misappropriation from the right of
publicity,158 others mix these categories in ways that make it difficult to tease apart the distinct
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claims, interests, and available remedies.159 For the purposes of this paper the important difference
between the right to publicity and misappropriation as encompassed in some definitions of the
invasion of privacy tort is that the right of publicity is generally seen in many jurisdictions as fully
alienable.160
In cases that raise both privacy and copyright claims, copyright claims often persist past
the dismissal of privacy claims. This article considers whether courts ought to entertain alternative
copyright claims when privacy concerns are at the heart of the alleged harm. What follows in Part
IV is a discussion of the relationship between privacy and copyright, the problems that arise when
copyright is deployed to protect privacy, and potential solutions to those problems.
IV. The Copyright / Privacy Nexus
In order to fully consider whether copyright should protect privacy, it is important to first
consider the theory underpinning both regimes. To the extent that the theoretical commitments of
each are irreconcilable, it is difficult to see how copyright might protect privacy interests. As
copyright and privacy have a long history of interconnectedness, considering the scholarship and
jurisprudence articulating those connections is vital. The Section that follows considers that
theory and history and then moves on to consider the problems posed by seeking to protect
privacy through copyright; specifically, copyright’s misfit for protecting privacy, a personal
right, and the potential for courts to misconstrue privacy as protected through copyright as
having constitutional proportions.
A. Considering the Compatibility of Copyright and Privacy Theory
The most commonly asserted justification for U.S. copyright law is the utilitarian theory,
pursuant to which copyright law exists simply to incentivize creators to give the public access to
their works.161 Copyright in the United States is therefore not generally seen as an end in itself.162
159
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Rather, giving the public access to creative works is the desired end, and the grant of copyright is
merely a means to achieve that end. 163
Unlike copyright, however, privacy is seen as an end in and of itself.164 The theory behind
this view of privacy is that all human beings are entitled to certain basic rights; among these is
privacy.165 While no consensus exists as to the precise contours of this privacy right,166 it is widely
asserted that it amounts to a “right to be let alone.”167 One interpretation of this concept is that the
“right to be let alone” is the right to be free from disclosure of certain personal facts.168
Bridging the gap between a copyright regime that is primarily a means by which to
encourage creation and dissemination and a privacy regime that seeks to prevent the disclosure of
certain private information will require more than an understanding of the primary normative
arguments behind these doctrines. Once one breaches the superficial arguments for why we grant
copyright and protect privacy, the overlap in these regimes becomes more apparent.
The Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”169 This clause is understood as a utilitarian authorization of intellectual
property rights.170 More specifically, the Supreme Court has recently stated, “[e]vidence from the
163
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founding . . . suggests that inducing dissemination . . . was viewed as an appropriate means to
promote science.”171 While this utilitarian theory of copyright is the most popular theory justifying
copyright,172 there is no question that courts and commentators alike also take seriously various
alternative theories. Chief among these are labor theory173 and personhood theory.174 These
alternative theories merit additional discussion because although neither is suggested by the
Constitution both arise in U.S. copyright cases and may help to bridge the gap between the
normative bases for copyright and privacy.
The labor theory of copyright is based upon John Locke’s now notorious proclamation that
“[t]hough the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property
in his own person, this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour [sic] of his body, and the
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”175 This proclamation, as applied to copyright,
suggests that while ideas should be “free to common use,”176 an author’s work embodied in her
particular expression of those ideas is worthy of copyright protection.177
While it was widely believed that the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone
Co.178 undercut labor theory as a viable basis for copyright protection in the United States, 179 the
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court’s recent decision in Golan v. Holder180 has arguably reinvigorated this theory.181 In Golan,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, noted that the legislation in question “gives [copyright
owners] nothing more than the benefit of their labors during whatever time remains before the
normal copyright term expires.”182 Justice Breyer, dissenting in Golan, took particular issue with
this statement, stating, “insofar as [the majority decision] suggests that copyright should in general
help authors obtain greater monetary rewards than needed to elicit new works, it rests upon
primarily European, but not American, copyright concepts.”183 Notwithstanding Justice Breyer’s
dismissal, labor theory has long been influential in American copyright.184 The majority decision
in Golan suggests that influence persists.185
Personhood theory, which is related to labor theory,186 suggests that policymakers ought to
consider the extent to which copyright allows for the fulfillment of basic human needs.187 Among
these basic needs are autonomy and self-realization.188 Many scholars have asserted that moral
rights serve this personhood protective function in other countries.189 While the U.S. has largely
been skeptical of moral rights in general, the rights of attribution and integrity have been partially
codified in American law by way of the Visual Artists Rights Act.190
In some sense, the fault line between utilitarian theories and natural rights theories is the
distinct focus of each. Utilitarian theories focus on the benefits that accrue to the public while
natural rights theories are concerned with the rights that vest in the copyright owner. Many see
policy choices in copyright law as exclusively in line with either utilitarian theories or natural
rights theories.191 However, this is a false dichotomy. Rather, these theories actually operate in
tandem. Instead of seeking to confer rights upon authors or to bring about a public benefit, policy
180
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makers tend to seek to strike the appropriate balance between these.192 The policy question, then
should be, what types of proprietary rights incentivize the optimal amount of creation and
dissemination?193
Understanding which theories are at work in individual cases becomes a bit more
complicated. Despite the fact that the United States has repeatedly eschewed protection of moral
rights, when examining individual cases it is apparent that personhood theory is, in fact,
operative.194 Courts, by and large, take seriously the argument that authors may have a relationship
to their works that is not proprietary but, rather, dignitary.195
Just as it is necessary to go beyond the most obvious justification for copyright in order to
fully understand how copyright and privacy may be reconciled, it is also essential to consider more
than just the primary privacy theory. Since the concept of privacy was initially introduced in
American legal scholarship, privacy scholars have historically argued from the perspective of
individual rights.196 In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis stated:
[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through
the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication,
is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual
to be let alone. . . . The principle which protects personal writings and all other
personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against
publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that
of an inviolate personality.197
Much of privacy scholarship has accepted this individually focused theory as sufficient to support
privacy rights.198
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However some contemporary privacy scholars are engaged in considering alternate bases
for privacy protection.199 For example, Neil Richards, in his 2015 book, Intellectual Privacy,200
argues that there are utilitarian reasons to protect privacy.201 Richards suggests that idea formation
requires intellectual privacy.202 Privacy, he argues, allows for the freedom of thought that is
necessary for the creation of works of authorship.203 In this way, he harmonizes the First
Amendment with privacy protection insofar as the end result is free expression.204
Since Richards is primarily focused upon articulating an alternative to the asserted conflict
between privacy and the First Amendment, he focuses upon the role idea formation plays in
political discourse.205 There is no doubt that the expression of ideas, assuming originality and
fixation, ordinarily results in the creation of copyrightable content. The argument that privacy is
a necessary precursor to the creation of intellectual works has long been present in copyright cases
and scholarship.206
If one considers merely the most proffered bases for copyright and privacy, it is difficult
to see how these two can be reconciled. However, once you scratch the surface, it becomes clear
that the cases for copyright and privacy have quite a bit in common. Utilitarian and natural rights
theories are present in both copyright and privacy jurisprudence and scholarship. Moreover, both
of these regimes argue for personal rights in the service of utilitarian ends. Recent privacy
scholarship suggests that the utilitarian ends of copyright and privacy are, in fact, overlapping.
The protection of privacy creates a space where people can think freely which allows for idea
formation that enhances both our public discourse and, ultimately, the public domain.
Given the capacity to harmonize the theoretical underpinnings of privacy and copyright,
the connection of these concepts in the case law is no surprise. In fact, in first articulating the right
to privacy, Warren and Brandeis relied heavily on copyright concepts. Immediately following is
an exposition of copyright’s role in the development of the idea of the right to privacy.
B. Copyright and Privacy Through the Ages
i.

The Historical Connection: From the Common Law Right of First
Publication to Copyright Preemption

Until the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, protection of works of authorship was
bifurcated: before publication, the work was protected by common law copyright, or the right of
199
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first publication.207 After publication, the work was protected by statute, assuming that the
statutory requirements were met.208 Common law copyright protected the author’s right to decide
when and if the work was communicated to the public.209 There is a general consensus that the
right of first publication lasted only until the work was published. 210 Scholars and courts also
agree that the common law right of first publication was more comprehensive than the statutory
copyright.211
The common law copyright is sometimes characterized as control over the physical copy
of the work.212 Other scholars consider the right of first publication as the right of market entry.213
Still others regard it as primarily protective of privacy.214 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis took
the argument that common law copyright served to protect privacy a step further by arguing that
it had the capacity to protect the privacy of persons other than authors; specifically, the subjects of
creative works. In fact, their argument that the right of privacy was already present in the common
law in 1890 was largely based on the right of first publication.215 They stated, “the legal doctrines
relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the common-law right to intellectual and artistic
property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general right to privacy, which
properly understood afford a remedy for the evils under consideration.”216
The Copyright Act of 1976 specifically preempts state and common law protections.217 As
such, any protection of privacy that copyright is supposed to provide must be located somewhere
in the statutory language of the Copyright Act. Those who have considered whether the language
of the Act supports privacy protections have concluded that the publication right in Section 106 of
the Copyright Act subsumes the common law right of first publication.218 Because of the historical
relationship between the right of first publication and privacy, commentators have located the
current Act’s protection of privacy in the publication right contained in Section 106.219 However,
the rights delineated in Section 106 are not limited in any way to the author. Instead, they are
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specifically deemed to be fully alienable by the statute.220 The next section of this article reflects
on cases in which courts have recognized privacy interests in copyright infringement cases.
ii.

From Harper & Row to Salinger v. Colting: Deploying the “Right Not to
Speak” in Copyright Infringement Cases

2015 marked thirty years since the Supreme Court decided Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises,221 in which it held that The Nation Magazine had infringed the copyright in
Gerald Ford’s memoir by publishing an article featuring excerpts of some 300 words. 222 In so
holding, the Court brought together concepts of privacy, first publication, and the right not to speak
in the context of a copyright infringement suit.223
The Supreme Court was faced with Harper & Row just eight years after it decided
Wooley.224 The Nation Magazine argued that its publication of the article excerpting Nixon’s
autobiography fell within the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press.225
In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court relied upon Wooley to declare that a copyright owner
has a right not to speak.226 In addition to Wooley, the Supreme Court cited a number of lower court
decisions including Schnapper v. Foley227 and Estate of Hemingway v. Random House.228
In Schnapper, the D.C. Circuit relied upon the right not to speak to hold that the First
Amendment did not require the court to issue a compulsory license allowing for the use of the
copyrighted works.229 The Court said, “[w]e see no reason why the same freedom [i.e., the right
not to speak] should not be granted to the unwilling speaker when it is a public television station.
There is no question but that these non-commercial broadcasters are fully protected by the First
Amendment.”230 Schnapper is an interesting case because, like Harper & Row and Salinger v.
Colting,231 the allegedly infringed works were already published. Therefore, the works would not
have been protected by common law copyright before the implementation of the 1976 Act. Yet,
the Court still extended protection to those works by reference to the Constitution. Setting aside
the lack of state action in Schnapper, the application of the common law copyright bolstered by
the right not to speak seems incongruous in this context because the works in question had already
been published.232

Id. at 624 (stating that copyright protection not only “provides an incentive for author to create works,” but also
“encourage[es] the public dissemination of those works”).
221
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
222
Id. at 569.
223
Id. at 554, 552-53, 559.
224
Id. at 539.
225
Id. at 540.
226
Id. at 559.
227
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
228
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968).
229
Schnapper, 667 F.2d at 114-15.
230
Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
231
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F. 3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
232
See Keller, supra note 181 at 537-38.
220

In the case involving Hemingway’s estate, however, the plaintiff apparently sought to stop
dissemination of previously unpublished communications.233 As such, the use of common law
copyright and, perhaps even the right not to speak, seems more appropriate.234 It is worth noting,
however, that Hemingway was already deceased at the time of the suit.235 The statutory protection
of the right to privacy in New York has always been limited to living persons, 236 which makes the
attempt to protect Hemingway’s right to privacy rather odd.237 The attempt to interpose copyright
to accomplish an end that the tort of invasion of privacy simply could not is deeply problematic.
In any event, imbuing that privacy interest with constitutional aspects simply lacks any support in
the privacy jurisprudence or copyright law.
The Harper & Row Court’s characterization of privacy interests as embodied in the right
of first publication and protected by reference to the “right not to speak” was initially read as a
near prohibition on the fair use of unpublished works.238 Rejecting The Nation’s argument that it
could make a fair use of material the author had demonstrated an intent to publish, the Court stated,
“[t]his argument assumes that the unpublished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to
letters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemination. It is true that common-law
copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy.”239 The Court then went on to
qualify that statement saying, “[i]n its commercial guise, however, an author's right to choose when
he will publish is no less deserving of protection.”240 The Court then upped the ante on protection
by invoking the right not to speak:
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on
the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably
defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect. Courts and

233

Estate of Hemingway, 244 N.E.2d at 254 n.1.
Id. at 255 (“The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the Voluntary public
expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is
necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom Not to speak publicly, one which serves the
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.”).
235
Id. at 253 (“Hemingway died in 1961.”).
236
Laurie Henderson, Protecting a Celebrity's Legacy: Living in California or New York Becomes the Deciding
Factor, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 165, 177 (2009); see also Marie Andree, Post Mortem Right of Publicity,
in Massachusetts and Arizona, LAW OFFICE OF MARIE-ANDREE WEISS (July 25, 2014) http://www.mawlaw.com/right-of-publicity/post-mortem-right-publicity-massachusetts-arizona/ (“New York does not recognize post
mortem right of publicity. As I wrote on the EASL blog a few years ago, the S.D.N.Y. ruled in 2007 that Marilyn
Monroe could not have passed any postmortem right of publicity through the residuary clause in her will, because
she did not own any post mortem right of publicity at the time of her death in 1962, Shaw Family Archives Ltd v.
CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F.Supp.2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). This decision led to the introduction of a bill, A08836
to amend New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51. It would have provided a postmortem right of publicity to
personalities, but was never enacted.”).
237
See supra Parts III.A. & III.A.i. on the inalienability of privacy rights.
238
Stephen S. Morrill, Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating the Fair Use
Accommodation of Competing Copyright and First Amendment Interests, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 616-617 (1984).
239
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985).
240
Id.
234

commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first publication in
particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment value.241
The right not to speak was largely a dead letter within the context of copyright infringement
litigation for more than twenty years, but experienced a resurgence in the Second Circuit’s 2010
decision in Salinger v. Colting.242 The Salinger Court, in deciding whether to reverse the district
court’s grant of preliminary injunctive relief, asserted infringement of the copyright owner’s right
not to speak in support of a finding of irreparable harm.243 The Court stated:
Next, the court must consider whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of a preliminary injunction, and the court must assess the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant. Those two items, both of which
consider the harm to the parties, are related. The relevant harm is the harm that (a)
occurs to the parties' legal interests and (b) cannot be remedied after a final
adjudication, whether by damages or a permanent injunction. The plaintiff's
interest is, principally, a property interest in the copyrighted material. But as the
Supreme Court has suggested, a copyright holder might also have a First
Amendment interest in not speaking.244
The Salinger Court went on to say: “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, and hence
infringement of the right not to speak, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.”245 Given that the Salinger decision is the first Second Circuit
decision applying eBay in the context of preliminary injunctive relief in a copyright infringement
suit,246 it seems likely that the deployment of the right not to speak to establish irreparable harm
will become more common. In fact, litigants in another jurisdiction have already advanced this
argument.247 In Bollea, the plaintiff employed this argument in the context of what was very
obviously a privacy case.248 So far, however, it appears that the right not to speak argument has
only succeeded in lower courts in the Second Circuit.249
241
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In Bond v. Blum,250 the Fourth Circuit unequivocally stated:
[T]he protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright law. To the contrary,
the copyright law offers a limited monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to
the creative work of the author. If privacy is the essence of [Plaintiff]'s claim, then
his action must lie in some common-law right to privacy, not in the Copyright
Act.”251
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, citing Bond approvingly,
disallowed injunctive relief where, “[t]he main concern proffered by Plaintiff—the concern that
spurred this litigation—well before Plaintiff obtained his purported ownership of a copyright in
the Video — is that the ‘private’ Video portrays him in poor light and in an embarrassing
fashion.”252 On the other hand, cases conducting fair use analyses of unpublished works do
consider the copyright owner’s asserted privacy interests.253 Given this split in authority, it is
unclear to what extent common law privacy protection survived the adoption of the 1976 Act.
Whatever privacy interest was protected by common law copyright prior to the adoption
of the 1976 Act, it was not an interest, when properly understood, that rises to constitutional
proportions. As such, the deployment of the right not to speak to protect any such privacy right is
out of line with copyright norms, privacy norms, and jurisprudence. The next section of this article
considers recent cases in which plaintiffs attempted to deploy copyright to protect against harms
ordinarily understood as invasions of privacy.
C. The Problems Posed by Protecting Privacy Through Copyright
Pamela Samuelson has suggested that several recent cases raise the question of “whether
copyright has recently become, at least in some instances, a more effective way to protect privacy
interests than privacy law alone would allow.”254 In considering this question, Samuelson has
presented four vastly different cases that question whether copyright may be utilized to halt
dissemination of a work.255 While the four cases diverge factually, they bear striking similarities
that demonstrate the problems that may result from protecting privacy through copyright. These
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issues primarily stem from two challenges. The first is differentiating between authorship and
copyright ownership. Second, courts must consider First Amendment protection issues raised in
the context of copyright infringement suits. What follows immediately is a discussion of these
two issues.
i.

The Subject / Author / Copyright Owner Conundrum

Distinguishing between the party protected by the right to privacy and the party protected
by copyright is a problem that has existed since the right to privacy was first articulated. The Right
to Privacy is clearly focused on the privacy of the subject of photographs and newspaper articles:
The right of one who has remained a private individual, to prevent his public
portraiture, presents the simplest case for . . . extension [of a cause of action for
invasion of privacy] . . . . If casual and unimportant statements in a letter, if
handiwork, however inartistic and valueless, if possessions of all sorts are protected
not only against reproduction, but against description and enumeration, how much
more should the acts and sayings of a man in his social and domestic relations be
guarded from ruthless publicity.256
Interestingly, Warren and Brandeis clearly understood that the existing common law right of first
publication inhered in authors rather than subjects:
The aim of those [copyright] statutes is to secure to the author, composer, or artist
the entire profits arising from publication; but the common-law protection enables
him to control absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own
discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publication at all.257
Moreover, Warren and Brandeis published The Right to Privacy six years after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony.258 In this landmark case, the Court
held that photographs are copyrightable content and that the owner of the copyright was the
photographer.259 The decision established that any copyright in photographs would belong to the
photographer rather than the subject of the photograph.260 Yet, Warren and Brandeis never
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mention this decision or seek to reconcile its holding with their assertion that common law
copyright provides precedent for the protection of the privacy of the subjects of photographs.261
Recent attempts to protect privacy by way of the 1976 Copyright Act demonstrate a similar
difficulty in determining whose privacy is being protected. In fact, recent cases complicate this
matter by adding the copyright owner as a potential party whose privacy interests can be asserted
through a claim of copyright infringement, even if the owner is not the author or the subject of the
work.262 Warren and Brandeis’ argument that the privacy of subjects of copyrightable content
deserves protection has, of course, won the day.263
This misfit of copyright law to remedy privacy harms is evident in the cases Samuelson
has highlighted. In two of the cases, the authors of the asserted works are not parties to the suit.264
In Balsley, the plaintiff purchased the copyright from the author (in this case, the photographer);265
and in Monge, it is entirely unclear whether the plaintiffs had a copyright interest in the works in
question at all.266 The Monge Court relied upon registration certificates produced by the plaintiff
and declined to “express [an] opinion as to the ownership of copyright regarding the sixth photo
[or] . . . as to the ultimate copyright status of any of the photos.”267 Samuelson has speculated,
“Monge must have purchased the copyrights in order to bring the lawsuit.”268 Unfortunately,
nothing in the opinion definitively answers whether the plaintiffs actually owned the copyrights in
question.
Likewise, in Garcia v. Google, Inc.,269 one of the primary points of contention between the
majority and dissenting opinions was whether the plaintiff could properly be described as an author
protected by the 1976 Copyright Act.270 Disagreement regarding authorship and copyright
ownership, as was seen in the two opinions, is ultimately caused by the difficult fit between the
Copyright Act and the protection of privacy interests. This is because copyright subsists initially
in the author (as opposed to the subject) of a work.271 The author may of course alienate her
interest in the work however she sees fit.272 However, once an author parts with her interest in the
work, it is the copyright owner, as opposed to the author or subject, who is protected by the
Copyright Act.273 Given the full alienability of copyright interests, privacy protection for the
261
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subject of a work through the Copyright Act is complicated even further. A brief foray into the
facts of Balsley v. LFP, Inc. will more fully demonstrate these difficulties.
In Balsley, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the defendant was entitled to a reversal of
the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury had rendered a
verdict of copyright infringement.274 In March 2003, the plaintiff, Catherine Balsley, was
photographed in various states of undress as she participated in a wet tee shirt contest at a bar in
Florida.275 The photographer, Gontran Durocher, posted the photographs of Balsley on
lenshead.com.276 In 2004, Balsley obtained and registered the copyrights in the photos taken by
Durocher.277 In 2005, a reader of the magazine nominated Balsley for Hustler Magazine’s “Hot
News Babes” contest.278 Employees of the magazine located the photos online and published one
of them in the February 2006 edition of Hustler Magazine.279 Balsley learned of the publication
of the photograph and sued, alleging copyright infringement and violation of Ohio’s right of
publicity statute and common law right of privacy, among other claims.280 The only claim
ultimately tried was the claim of copyright infringement, on which the jury found for the plaintiff
and awarded damages in the amount of $135,000.281 The defendant moved for judgment as a
matter of law on the issue of fair use and then appealed the trial court’s denial of that motion.282
One of the most interesting things about Balsley is that the “Plaintiffs sought ownership of
the photographs so that they would have a legal means of ending the photographs' dissemination.
They negotiated with Durocher, who sold, transferred, and assigned all rights, title, and interest in
the copyright to the photographs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then registered their acquired copyright
with the United States Copyright Office.”283 What this means, of course, is that in order to be in
a position to use the Copyright Act to “end the photographs’ dissemination” Balsley had to
negotiate with Durocher who, at least arguably, was himself responsible for a significant incursion
upon Balsley’s right to privacy.284 Note that as the subject of the photograph, Balsley had no
protectable copyright interest in the picture. Rather, that interest arose in Durocher, who took the
picture and was responsible for its initial online dissemination. A system that requires Balsley to
negotiate with Durocher as a prerequisite to properly protecting her privacy interests seems bizarre
to say the least.
The problem of using copyright to protect the privacy interests of subjects has inhered in
privacy theory since its inception, when Warren and Brandeis avoided the ambiguity between
author and subject in their initial exposition of the right to privacy. The move to locate the privacy
protection previously understood as provided for by common law copyright within a statutory
274

Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 755.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 756.
281
Id. at 756-57.
282
Id. at 757.
283
Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
284
Durocher’s dissemination of the picture of Balsley is, at least arguably, a misappropriation of Balsley’s likeness
and/or her right of publicity.
275

provision providing rights that are fully alienable further complicates matters by adding the
copyright owner to the author and subject as persons potentially seeking to enforce the right. But,
that isn’t the only problem presented by seeking to use copyright to protect privacy. Doing so also
raises real First Amendment concerns.
ii.

The Problem of Constitutional Privacy Rights in Tort Privacy
Circumstances

Samuelson posits that copyright infringement claims are attractive to litigants seeking to
stem the dissemination of particular works, at least in part, “because of . . . the inhospitable
reception courts have had to First Amendment defenses in copyright cases.”285 In three of the four
cases Samuelson describes, in addition to the copyright infringement claim(s), the plaintiffs
asserted claims for either infringement of the right to privacy or the right of publicity. 286 In Hill,
while the copyright infringement action proceeded, the right of publicity claim was dismissed due
to a perceived conflict with the First Amendment.287 In Balsley, the Court granted the defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment as to the right to privacy and right of publicity claims.288 The trial
court in Monge dismissed the misappropriation claim and granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant on the issue of fair use.289 The plaintiffs only appealed the fair use holding.290 What
all of these outcomes demonstrate is that copyright infringement allegations are more likely to
hold up for a plaintiff than are right to privacy or right of publicity claims. This helps to explain
why one seeking to stop the dissemination of a particular work might opt to proceed under
copyright in addition to any extant privacy causes of action. While a cursory examination of these
cases demonstrates the validity of Samuelson’s insight, closer analysis also reveals some of the
potential hazards that may arise when one whose privacy interest is endangered by dissemination
of a work proceeds under copyright.
The protection of privacy interests through the copyright statute creates some troubling
First Amendment conundrums. As the immediately preceding discussion makes clear, plaintiffs
who cannot proceed under privacy protections without running afoul of the First Amendment are
able to circumvent the First Amendment by acquiring the copyright in the works at issue. This
ought to concern policy makers considering the usefulness of copyright as a privacy protection
mechanism. The Supreme Court simply got this wrong in Harper & Row.291 Courts making these
determinations now ought to refuse to perpetuate that reasoning. What follows immediately are
some modest suggestions for alternative paths forward.
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D. Potential Legislative Solutions
The Supreme Court’s deployment of the right not to speak to protect the asserted interests of
President Ford in Harper & Row v. The Nation,292 as relied upon by the Second Circuit in
Salinger v. Colting,293 epitomizes the worst-case scenario that results when Courts utilize
copyright to protect privacy interests. Protecting privacy interests by reference to the existing
common law paradigm is superior to utilizing the Copyright Act and suggesting that
constitutional privacy interests are somehow implicated. This is because traversing the copyright
route could potentially fail to protect the subject of the work and presents serious First
Amendment concerns.294 Of course, this leaves privacy plaintiffs without any remedy akin to the
takedown procedure the DMCA provides.295 It also, arguably, fails to recognize the privacy
protection provided to authors by way of the common law right of first publication. What
follows is a brief consideration of some potential legislative actions that may address those
issues.
i.

A Federal Privacy Statute for the Internet

Protecting privacy on the internet is imperative.296 The Ashley Madison leak demonstrates
the very real need for a mechanism like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s takedown
procedure to enable privacy victims to have an immediate remedy. Although federal legislation
to protect individuals from online privacy violations has been proposed a number of times,297
currently, there does not appear to be political will to pass such legislation. Moreover, the
proposed bills have been criticized for being both too narrow and toothless.298 Given the privacy
plaintiff’s propensity to use the Copyright Act as a mechanism to alleviate invasions of privacy,
the remedies provided for in the Copyright Act may provide a model for the type of remedy that
could be effective in protecting privacy online.
Of course, any such remedy must be sensitive to the potential First Amendment
implications of removing content at the behest of a person who is depicted in it. Specifically, the
challenge will be articulating the class of content that, if objected to by the subject, is private.
Matters of public record, such as the marriage of the plaintiffs in Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc.299
are very plainly excluded from common law privacy protection and ought to be excluded from any
federal statutory protection as well. The more difficult line drawing will have to take place in
considering what matter is private on its face. This is so because a matter that is considered private
for a non-public figure, may be considered public for a public figure. Moreover, the law has long
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recognized that an individual may be a limited-purpose public figure if she finds herself embroiled
in a matter of public concern.
Parsing these distinctions has, of course, proven difficult for courts and commentators
addressing privacy claims. Legislating in this area on the federal level poses the same difficulties
and presents additional difficulties by asking internet service providers to engage in exceedingly
difficult decision-making. We have already seen the difficulties associated with fair use and, by
extension, First Amendment questions in the context of the DMCA. That said, if we value privacy
interests at least as much as we do copyright interests, it makes sense to attempt such legislative
reform despite the associated difficulties. Likewise, if we are committed to the common law
principle of protecting authors’ privacy (as opposed to the privacy of subjects), we ought to
consider doing so transparently by adopting the moral right of disclosure.
ii.

Amending the Copyright Act to Limit Privacy Claims by Adopting the Moral
Right of Disclosure

Under the common law, the right of first publication inhered in the author. 300 No subject
had any interest in the work or any right to allow for or restrict dissemination.301 The right of first
publication expired upon the authorized publication of the work.302 The right of first publication
was viewed as a protection of authorial privacy, so the choice to publish effectively waived any
privacy concerns.303 The move to protect privacy through federal statute failed to account for the
alienability of the rights represented in the Copyright Act of 1976.304 As such, what was
constituted as protection for authorial privacy under the common law has now morphed into an
unrecognizable and unjustifiable right that may be asserted regardless of the identity of the person
asserting it. This is entirely out of line with both the common law copyright and the right to privacy
jurisprudence. If, in undertaking a wholesale revision of the Copyright Act, it is deemed
appropriate to protect the privacy of authors as the common law had done, the simplest mechanism
for doing so may be to statutorily adopt the moral right of disclosure which “recognizes the author
as the ultimate judge of when and under what conditions a work can be disseminated.”305
V. Conclusion
Returning to where this paper began, what Ashley Madison ultimately needed was a
particular, enforceable remedy to remove its subscribers’ personal information from the internet.
In seeking to fulfill that need, Avid, the owner of the Ashley Madison website, reached for the
regulatory scheme best equipped to provide the desired result—the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. As contemporaneous commentators noted, it is entirely plausible that the content in question
was not copyrightable in the first place. Even if it was, there was at least a colorable argument
that Avid was not the author or copyright owner of the content. In this article I have argued that
even if copyright can be contorted to cover a case like the Ashley Madison case, perhaps it should
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not. This contortion has the potential to create both doctrinal and practical problems, including,
most notably, providing perverse incentives to copyright owners to threaten to post content to the
internet unless the subject pays up.
Note, though, that suggesting that copyright does not provide a remedy in situations like
this is not meant to suggest that no remedy ought to be available. Rather, this article suggests that
the appropriate paradigm for considering such a remedy is a federal privacy statute that provides
a takedown mechanism analogous to the one provided in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
It would, of course, be entirely appropriate for such a paradigm to import the free speech and
freedom of the press protections already present in the common law of privacy. As for providing
copyright owners with the right of first publication that inhered in the common law long before
the passage of the current Copyright Act, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, as many other
countries already protect an author’s moral right of disclosure. As Congress begins to develop the
next great copyright act, it might do well to consider whether statutorily adopting such a right
would be appropriate.

